Wednesday, March 15, 2006

Virtue Theory and Abortion

Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20(3), Summer 1991, 223-246.

Responds to 9 common objections to virtue theory: 7 minor, 2 “major”. The two major objections are related to a concern about the applicability and justificatory power of virtue theory in relation to particular decisions, and Hursthouse aims to ameliorate this concern by demonstrating how virtue theory should lead us to think about abortion.

Begins with a nice structural comparison of deontology (connects the concepts of ‘right action,’ ‘moral rule,’ and ‘rationality’), utilitarianism (connects the concepts of ‘right action’, ‘consequences,’ and ‘happiness’), and virtue theory (connects the concepts of ‘right action’, ‘virtuous agent’ and ‘flourishing’).

The 7 minor objections and responses:
Objection 1: Eudaimonia is a hopelessly and uniquely obscure concept.
Response: No more so than ‘rationality’ or ‘happiness’

Objection 2: VT is trivially circular, specifying right action in terms of virtuous agents in terms of right action.
Response: Right action is specified in terms of virtuous agents/virtues which are in turn specified in terms of flourishing. There may be a larger (non-trivial?) circle from there back to right action.

Objection 3: VT is about Being and not Doing.
Response: False. VT does answer the question “What should I do?”

Objection 4: VT is unprincipled and guides only by example.
Response: There is a role for principles. Every virtue generates a positive instruction (act justly, kindly, courageously, etc). Not necessary to have an example of a virtuous person.

Objection 5: VT reduces all moral concepts to virtuous agency.
Response: To the contrary, VT is anti-reductionist and relies on thick moral concepts like charity and benevolence as well as thinner ones like good, evil, harm, worthwhile, pleasant, etc.

Objection 6: Which traits count as virtues is a debatable or even relativist matter.
Response: Both VT and deontology at some point have to stick their necks out and say that some trait or rule is the right one, and those who deny it are mistaken.

Objection 7: Virtues can generate conflicting requirements.
Response: Even a deontology with just one rule can yield contrary instructions in certain circumstances (e.g. Williams’ Jim and Pedro).

Objection 8: VT has to just assert that certain actions are virtuous or not, without argument.
Response: A theory that doesn’t make it easy to apply a moral rule or concept isn’t inadequately action-guiding, but rather accurate.
Objection 9: VT has to just declare certain actions or ways of being worthwhile, without argument.
Response: A theory that requires taking a stand on what is worthwhile isn’t inadequately action-guiding, but rather accurate. The alternative would be to say that a good moral theory should make it possible for someone with no or extremely mistaken opinions on what is worthwhile to give good advice about what morally one should do.


Abortion
VT makes both women’s rights and fetal status irrelevant to the question whether it is right or wrong to have an abortion in certain circumstances.
• In exercising a moral right, one can do something cruel or callous or stupid or disloyal, etc.
• And having the correct attitude toward something such as a fetus is not a matter of its (metaphysical) status, but rather having the familiar biological facts about the fetus and the pregnancy operate in one’s practical reasoning in a virtuous way.

• The biological facts about human reproduction and our emotions in relation to them make pregnancy and terminating it morally serious. Thus to think of abortion as insignificant or purely instrumental to a trivial end is not virtuous. (Consistent with sense that grief over miscarriage is appropriate.)
• Value assumptions: 1. parenthood, motherhood, and childbearing are intrinsically valuable. 2. Else being equal, it is an “evil” when a human life is cut short.
• Some suggestion that it is at least understandable that we should treat early abortion as less serious. Unclear whether she thinks it in fact is less serious.
• In some circumstances, viewing abortion as the blessed escape from a prospect of 8 months of misery and near unbearable burden “does not manifest lack of serious respect for human life or shallow attitude toward motherhood.” This indicates something wrong with the circumstances. (VT has “built-in indexicality”.)
• Sometimes abortion is the right thing to do, but one is in the circumstances where it is the right thing to do through a failure of virtue. Hence it can be appropriate to feel guilt and regret at rightly choosing an abortion.