Between Consenting Adults

Onora O’Neill, “Between Consenting Adults,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (3), 252-77.

Examines the moral ideals of not “using” people, and of “treating others as persons.”

Rejects three common conceptions of these ideals:
1. “The Personal Touch:” living up to these ideals is a matter of employing a certain tone and manner, or not being indifferent. Rejected as neither necessary (impersonal relation w/salesperson) nor sufficient (charming seduction).
2. “Actual Consent:” living up to these ideals is a matter of never treating people in ways they do not consent to being treated. Rejected because consent is opaque and actual consent may not track the morally significant aspects of plans, proposals, and intentions consented to.
3. “Hypothetical Consent:” living up to these ideals is a matter of never treating people in ways that a fully rational person would not consent to be treated. Rejected because it may lead to coercing people in the name of more rational selves (cf Isaiah Berlin, “Two Conceptions of Freedom”). Also, conception needs to be supplemented with an account of which aspects of action must be hypothetically consented to—which aspects are morally significant.

A related, general point: these ideals are not primarily a matter of treating people as they want or would want to be treated: “If wants or rationalized preferences are morally fundamental, consent is of derivative concern.”

Proposes (Kantian) alternative: “Possible Consent”
• Actions are done on maxims (underlying principles, not necessarily fundamental intentions)
• Two kinds of maxims involve using another (failures of respect)*:
o Maxims to which no other [sic? Another?] could possibly consent, such as maxims of coercion or deception. Doesn’t cash out the notion of possible consent.
o Maxims to pursue ends that another cannot share
• Failing to live up to the ideal of treating others as persons may require yet more positive consideration—requires taking into account “humanity in their person”; their particular capacities for rational and autonomous action. Requires endeavoring to further the ends of others (beneficence)*.

*A little unclear whether respect/beneficence are supposed to track don’t use/treat as person.

Discusses how these ideals, conceived in Kantian way, play out in the context of sexual relationships and employment.

Tags: consent, respect for persons, using people